Identifying individuals\u27 preferences using games: A field experiment in promoting sustainable energy consumption by Baeriswyl, Michael et al.
 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011 1 
IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUALS’ PREFERENCES USING 
GAMES: A FIELD EXPERIMENT IN PROMOTING 
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
Research-in-Progress 
 
Michael C. Baeriswyl 
ETH Zurich, D-MTEC 




ETH Zurich, D-GESS 
Clausiusstrasse 50, 8092 Zurich 
wojtek.przepiorka@soz.gess.ethz.ch  
Thorsten R. Staake 
ETH Zurich, D-MTEC 
Scheuchzerstrasse 7, 8092 Zurich 
tstaake@ethz.ch 
Abstract 
We present a novel approach to identify individuals’ preferences in the context of 
sustainable energy consumption by letting them play a public good game (PGG). The 
study will be conducted using an energy-efficiency website developed by us and 
operated by an Austrian utility company that currently facilitates 9,929 users out of 
which 1,000 will be randomly selected as participants. Laboratory experiments on 
PGGs identified two types of cooperative behavior: free riders and conditional 
cooperators. While free riders tend to act unaffected by the behavior of others, 
conditional cooperators are stronger influenced by the perception of their peers. In our 
study, participants receive normative feedback on their consumption, and we 
investigate the moderating effects of the PGG’s results on changes in energy 
consumption. The findings will contribute to the design of information systems to 
promote environmental sustainability because their effectiveness is increased if the 
consumption feedback provided reflects the recipient’s preference.  
Keywords:  Environmental sustainability, game theory, green IS, empirical research 
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Introduction 
Information systems have the potential to promote environmentally sustainable behaviors such as energy 
conservation (Melville 2010; Watson 2010). Residential energy consumption is continuously increasing. 
Today, households consume about one-third of the total energy generated in the U.S., where electricity 
generation is one of the leading sources of carbon dioxide emissions (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Administration, 2009). Energy conservation increases environmentally sustainability by reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions. The present study is concerned with the design and evaluation of a customer-oriented 
website called “Velix” that provides users with feedback about their energy consumption and supports 
them by providing energy-saving tips. The overall goal of Velix is to advance the research on promoting 
environmentally sustainability using information systems. We developed Velix in cooperation with an 
Austrian utility company. The customers of the utility company are given bonus points that encourage 
them to read their electricity meters on a weekly basis and enter their readings online. Since April 1st 
2010, 9,929 customers have joined Velix, and those customers entered more than 217,299 meter readings. 
Recent studies (Abrahamse et al. 2005; Allcott 2010; Costa & Kahn 2010) have indicated that the 
effectiveness of consumption-related feedback depends on people’s preferences. For instance, although 
individuals with pro-environmental preferences are more responsive to peer comparison, the latter leads 
to unintended consequences (e.g., increased consumption) for individuals with conservative preferences 
(Costa & Kahn 2010). Thus, if the same feedback is effective for environmentalists but is ineffective with 
conservative individuals, it is necessary to identify these individuals and provide them with targeted 
feedback to address all individuals in a heterogeneous population. 
This planned study presents a novel approach to identifying individuals’ preferences by letting them play 
a public good game on Velix. The public good game is a well-known game in experimental economics. 
Laboratory experiments on public good games have identified two types of cooperative behavior: free 
riding and conditional cooperating (Fischbacher et al. 2001; Gächter 2006). Whereas free riders act 
unaffected by the behavior of others, conditional cooperators are influenced by their perceptions 
regarding the behavior of others. Our study includes 1000 customers to be studied during a period of 
eight weeks. The customers will play the public good game and receive normative feedback that detailed 
average neighborhood energy consumption. We will then measure customer changes in energy 
consumption. Like recommendation agents that elicit the interests or preferences of individual consumers 
regarding products and make recommendations accordingly (Komiak and Benbasat 2006; Xiao and 
Benbasat 2007; Kamis et al. 2008), our approach has the potential to individually support and improve 
the quality of the decisions that consumers make when consuming energy at home. On the basis of the 
relevant literature, we expect conditional cooperators to adapt their energy consumption so that it 
conforms significantly more with average consumption than does that of free riders. Our study is 
interesting from an information systems, behavioral economics and socio-psychological perspective. Our 
findings will contribute to information systems research regarding environmental sustainability by 
investigating individual preferences and the promotion of human behavior.  
The next section reviews the findings of previous studies regarding the promotion of sustainable behavior 
in information systems research, public good games and conditional cooperation in economics. It also 
reviews relevant information regarding normative feedback in social psychology. The third section states 
our hypothesis. Section four describes our empirical study. Section five presents our conclusions. 
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Related work 
Research on promoting sustainable behavior in information systems 
IT enables large-scale customer engagement, providing added value while positively influencing 
consumption behavior (Oinas-Kukkonen & Harjumaa 2008). Researchers have started to explore the 
positive influence of IT on sustainability under the umbrella term “Green IS” (Watson et al. 2008). IT has 
the potential to promote sustainability within all areas of an organization (Watson et al. 2010). Literature 
reviews on Green IS have been presented by Molla (2009), Ijab et al. (2010), Bengtsson & Ågerfalk 
(2010), Melville (2010), and Jenkin et al. (2011). Some Green IS artifacts can be found in the academic 
literature. For instance, Froehlich et al. (2009) presented “UbiGreen”, a mobile tool for tracking and 
supporting green transportation habits, and Björkskog et al. (2010) developed “Energy Life”, a system 
using wireless sensors and mobile and ambient interfaces to promote energy conservation. Similarly, 
Holmes (2007) presented a public art project that measures energy usage, and Grevet et al. (2010) 
developed a space for social visualizations of energy conservation behavior. Finally, Graham et al. (2011) 
studied the effects of an online intervention on college students’ driving behavior. These examples 
illustrate the opportunities that the combination of technological expertise and socio-psychological theory 
offers for IS research. From a technological standpoint, the high penetration rate of the Internet (ITU 
2010), the decreasing price of broadband Internet access (ITU 2010), and the rapid diffusion of mobile 
devices (Pitt et al. 2011) allow ubiquitous information access by organizations and consumers (Watson et 
al. 2008). From a socio-psychological standpoint, the extensive use of theories from sociology and 
psychology has contributed to our understanding of the social context of IS (Lim et al. 2009; Sidorova et 
al. 2008) 
Research on public good games in economics 
When it comes to providing a public good, such as a clean environment, standard economic theory 
predicts that individuals will free ride on the contributions of others. For example, individuals free ride on 
the efforts of others to protect the environment. In reality, researchers have shown that individuals free 
ride less often than predicted. In a variety of situations, they do not behave self-interested, but rather 
prosocially. Motivated by these findings, a large number of studies in behavioral economics and 
behavioral game theory have emerged to explain individuals’ prosocial behavior. This study examines the 
public good game (PGG). The PGG represents a social dilemma: that is, a decision situation in which 
individual incentives are at odds with collective interests. In the PGG, N participants are endowed with E 
monetary units each. Next, the participants decide individually how much of their endowment they want 
to invest in the PG (xi) and how much they want to keep for themselves (E-xi). The total amount invested 
in the PG is then multiplied by a factor m (where m < N) and equally divided. The utility that participant 
derives from his investment is 
 
The notion of conditional cooperation emerged from the empirical finding in experimental economics that 
subjects base their contributions to public goods on the contribution levels of other participants 
(Fischbacher et al. 2001; Gächter 2006; Keser & van Winden 2000). Fischbacher et al. (2001) have 
suggested using the strategy method to elicit contributions from subjects in public goods games. In their 
experiment, the participants stated their contributions as a function of the group members’ average 
contribution. The main advantage of this approach is that free riders contributing nothing can be 
separated from pessimistic conditional cooperators. On the basis of their findings, Fischbacher et al. 
(2001) classified their participants according to their contribution function. Whereas a free rider 
contributes nothing in all cases, a conditional cooperator employs a contribution scheme that is a positive 
function of the average contribution of the other participants. One special type is the “triangle 
contributor,” whose contribution increases when that of others is low and decreases when that of others is 
high. The researchers found fifty percent of their participants to be conditional cooperators, 30% free 
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riders, and the remainder either triangle contributors or non-classifiable. Several other experimental 
studies with public goods games have classified participants as free riders or conditional cooperators (e.g., 
Page et al. 2005). Figure 1, for instance, shows the average contribution of the different types reported by 
Gächter (2006). These studies have provided consistent evidence that subjects are heterogeneous in their 
motives for cooperating and, most important, that the behavior of the majority of subjects is conditionally 
cooperative. However, these studies findings are criticized because it is suggested to be unclear whether 
subjects’ behavior in the laboratory is indicative of their behavior in the real world. The question of what 
laboratory experiments reveal about the real world was explicitly addressed by Levitt and List (2007). 
They note that unlike in a real-world setting, subjects’ decisions in the laboratory are mostly subject to 
higher levels of perceived scrutiny, are mostly embedded in a context-free environment, mostly involve 
lower stakes, are mostly taken by students with an increased willingness to participate in such 
experiments, are always restricted to a predefined choice set, and are made within a particularly narrow 
time frame. All of these factors, with regard to which laboratory and real-world settings differ, are 
important determinants of subject cooperation and should be carefully considered when “insights gained 
in the lab [are] extrapolated to the world beyond.” 
 
 
Figure 1. Average contribution functions (Fischbacher & Gächter 
2006)  
 
Several findings from field experiments are consistent with laboratory evidence of conditional cooperation 
(for a review, see Gächter 2006). For instance, Frey and Meier (2005) compared students’ beliefs about 
other students’ contributions to a fund for needy or foreign students and their own contributions to the 
fund. The researchers found a moderate correlation between stated expectations and behavior. However, 
because people may form expectations about others to justify their own behavior, the researchers also 
varied expectations about others’ behavior experimentally. The two treatments offered feedback that 
reported a high (64%) or low (46%) percentage of students to have contributed to the fund, respectively. 
After controlling for subjects’ previous contribution behavior, the researchers found a considerable 
positive effect of the high-feedback condition. Shang & Croson (2005) conducted a field experiment on 
donations to a public radio station. At a radio fundraiser, people called in to make a donation were told 
what others had donated in the past. Callers who were informed of a previous pledge donated on average 
more than the people in the reference group, who were not confronted with that information. Heldt 
(2005) tested for conditional cooperation among tourists who use a cross-country skiing slope for whose 
preparation they are asked to donate. The author found that tourists who were informed that 70% of all 
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tourists had donated to the fund for preparing the slope contributed more on average than did those who 
were not informed about others’ contributions. 
Research on normative feedback in social psychology 
The notion of conditional cooperation does not imply anything about individuals’ motives for aligning 
behavior with that of others in a normative setting. In this regard, this concept overlaps with that of social 
norms as familiar from a growing body of literature in sociology and social psychology. For instance, the 
provision of normative feedback causes people to reduce littering (Cialdini et al. 1990), increase recycling 
(Cialdini 2003), and increase towel reuse when staying in hotels (Goldstein et al. 2008). In the context of 
energy conservation, several field experiments have reported the positive effect of providing people with 
information about the level of energy consumption of their peers (e.g., Allcott 2010; Schultz et al. 2007). 
These studies indicate that peer comparison decreased consumption by 1 to 2 percent. Schultz et al. 
(2007) demonstrated that normative feedback regarding personal and average neighborhood energy 
consumption induces people to adjust their energy consumption to make it closer to average 
consumption. Interestingly, descriptive feedback alone causes both below-average and above-average 
energy consumers to adjust their consumption so that it is closer to average consumption. However, 
recent studies have indicated that the effect of social norms is limited to persons with specific preferences 
(Abrahamse et al. 2005; Allcott 2010; Costa & Kahn 2010). Costa & Kahn (2010) have argued that the 
effectiveness of peer comparison depends on people’s preferences. The researchers found that persons 
with pro-environmental and liberal preferences are more responsive to peer comparison than is the 
average person. In contrast, for certain subsets of republicans, peer comparison actually increased energy 
consumption in that study. The authors concluded that if the same message is effective for 
environmentalists but is ineffective with conservative individuals, a “mixed-message strategy” is necessary 
to reach all individuals in a heterogeneous population. 
Hypothesis 
Our study draws from the literature on promoting sustainable behavior in information systems research, 
conditional cooperation in economics and normative feedback in social psychology. Our main conjecture 
is that individuals differ in their propensity to respond to normative feedback about energy consumption 
and that this heterogeneity can be captured by these individuals’ behavior in a public goods game 
conducted using an IT platform.  
H1:  Subjects identified as conditional cooperators in the PGG are significantly more responsive to 
normative feedback than subjects identified as self-interested.  
This hypothesis implies that conditional cooperators adjust their energy consumption to the level of the 
reference group irrespective of whether their level was previously above or below that level. Self-
interested subjects, on the other hand, can be expected to behave differently depending on their relative 
consumption level. There is no reason to expect that self-interested individuals will adjust their 
consumption upwards if it is below average. If it is above average, however, they may start trading off the 
costs of energy conservation against the benefits. Essentially, those for whom it pays to save energy will 
adjust their consumption downwards, whereas the others will not. Note that conditional cooperators are 
not precluded from trading off costs against benefits as self-interested subjects are. Conditional 
cooperators, however, have an additional motive that makes them more likely to adjust their energy 
consumption to the average level than are self-interested types. We tested our hypothesis in a field 
experiment that combined a public goods game with normative feedback about individuals’ energy 
consumption.  
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Empirical study 
Technological platform 
We developed an energy efficiency website called Velix in cooperation with an Austrian utility company to 
provide the company’s customers with feedback on their electricity consumption and to support them by 
presenting them with energy-saving tips. The website serves as the basis for an energy-saving campaign 
for the company and is available to all household customers, who can easily register online. To promote 
the website, the utility company informed its customers via its customer magazine and collaborated with a 
local media corporation that placed ads in newspapers and the news website. Velix combines energy 
record-keeping with game-like tasks. Customers receive bonus points that encourage them to read their 
electricity meter on a weekly basis and enter the readings online. The meter readings are checked for 
plausibility using an algorithm the utility employs to prevent incorrect data input in self-reading 
processes used for billing. Once the second meter reading has been entered, Velix calculates the 
corresponding energy consumption figures and provides each user with feedback intended to stimulate 
energy conservation (see Figure 1). Since April 1st 2010, 9,929 customers have joined Velix, and they 
entered more than 217,299 meter readings. The average time spent on Velix is about 5.5 minutes. To 
assure the reliability of the meter readings, we used multiple strategies. First, we instructed participants 
regarding where to find and how to read the electricity meter. Then, we implemented algorithms intended 
to verify the validity of the meter readings. For example, if a participant had entered a negative value or a 
meter reading lower than the previous one, he or she would receive an error notification. Additionally, we 
determined the validity of the self-reported data for a subset of customers. Finally, we compared the 
yearly energy consumption figures for 2010 and 2011. It was expected that the resulting correlation would 
confirm the validity of the self-reported data. 
 
 
Figure 2: Data entry and energy consumption reports provided by Velix  
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We created Velix for two reasons. First, we wanted to motivate a large number of users to engage in 
energy conservation by providing them with feedback on their consumption behavior. Second, we 
intended to experimentally assess which socio-psychological concepts (e.g., social norms) are best suited 
to promote residential energy conservation. Velix has allowed us to evaluate these concepts by conducting 
experiments with a large number of users in a real-world setting. Every new user is automatically assigned 
to an experiment after registration. On the basis of the assignment, Velix then provides the participant 
with a different type of feedback based on a specific socio-psychological concept.  
Methodology 
The experiment will include 1000 or more customers of an Austrian utility company and will begin on 
June 1st, 2011. Figure 3 summarizes the experimental design. We will first conduct a survey in which we 
identify the participants’ personality (e.g., environmental awareness and previous efforts to conserve 
energy) and socio-demographic status (e.g., age, education, work, income, household size, and number of 
household members). This allows us to investigate whether or not the participants have distinct 
characteristics and to ensure the generalizability of the study. At the same time, we will measure all 
participants’ baseline energy consumption. Their baseline energy consumption will be determined using 
the meter readings obtained during the first two weeks of the study. Then, participants will be randomly 
assigned to a treatment or a control group with 500 participants in each. Next, half of the participants will 
play the one-shot PGG. To avoid a potential sequence effect, the other half of the participants will play the 
PGG after the main manipulation. In total, 100 games will be played, to each of which 10 participants will 
be assigned randomly. A detailed description of the implementation of the PGG can be found in the next 
subsection. The participants in the treatment group will receive normative feedback (see Figure 4). The 
feedback will consist of a scale that compares the participant’s weekly energy consumption (in kWh) to 
the average energy consumption of the treatment group. Participants in the control group will receive no 
such feedback. A customer-care hotline, a contact form, and a forum will be used to contact the utility 
company with questions regarding feedback. However, all participants will receive instructions regarding 
how to reduce their energy consumption. All participants’ energy consumption will be monitored on a 
weekly basis for another five weeks. In a short follow-up survey, we will ask participants whether or not 
they tried to save energy during the previous few weeks and for what reasons they did or did not do so. 
Their answers will allow us to test the validity of our experimental results. 
 
 
Figure 3. Experimental design 
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Figure 4. Normative feedback 
Implementation of the PGG 
The following section presents a detailed description of the implementation of the PGG. The PGG will 
begin with the instruction screen (see Figure 5). This screen describes the decision situation and explains 
how the participant’s decision and the decisions of the other group members affect the payoff. The 
participants will be told that the payoffs are points that later can be exchanged for entertainment goods 
using the website’s online store. Next, the participants will take a quiz consisting of 5 questions about the 
instructions. The correct answers will be shown on the next screen. Then, the participants will have to 
state how many of their points they want to keep for themselves and how many they want to contribute to 
the public good (PG). The points in the public good will be tripled and equally distributed to all 10 group 
members. The participants will have to state their unconditional (irrespective of what the other group 
members do) and conditional contributions (respective of what the other group members do) to the PG. 
Both decisions will be incentivized because the participants will be told that their payoffs will be 
calculated based on either their unconditional or conditional decision (with equal probability). Next, the 
participants will be asked a question about what they understand about the instructions and the decision 
situation. As soon as all group members have stated their contributions, the final screen, detailing the 
participant’s payoff, will appear. The payoffs of the first five participants will be calculated according to 
their unconditional contributions and the payoff of the other five participants will be calculated according 
to their conditional contributions given the other group members’ unconditional contributions (see 
Fischbacher et al. 2001).  
 
 
Figure 5. Instruction screen of the public good game 
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Data analysis 
Given the data about the participants’ energy consumption behavior and their behavior in the PGG, we 
will analyze if the PGG indicates participants responsiveness to normative feedback in the context of 
energy consumption. We will use the R statistical software including the lme4 package to aggregate and 
analyze the data. We will apply generalized linear mixed models to deal with the autocorrelation of errors 
in the longitudinal data structure. 
Potential contributions 
Our study may make four potential contributions. First, our findings will contribute to IS research on 
environmental sustainability by investigating the detection of individual preferences and the promotion of 
human behavior. Second, our potential findings may help us to better understand and identify 
individuals’ preferences regarding energy conservation. These findings might also help practitioners 
designing energy conservation interventions to develop more user-oriented and effective interventions. 
Third, the PGG has been extensively investigated in experimental social science for the last three decades, 
but little research has been conducted on factors that might promote or prevent cooperation in real-world 
public good dilemmas. The findings of our study might help to bridge the gap between experimental and 
real-world economics and social science. Our findings may show that motives relevant for cooperation in 
experimental games also have an impact on real-world behavior. Finally, follow-up studies may show that 
the same method might be applied using the platform Velix for different topics, such as fuel or water 
consumption. 
Conclusion 
In the study detailed in this paper, we will evaluate a customer-oriented website called Velix that provides 
customers with feedback about their energy consumption and supports them by providing energy-saving 
tips. This paper presents a novel approach to identifying individuals’ preferences: that of letting them play 
a public good game on Velix. The results of this study will help to identify individual preferences and 
provide individuals with targeted feedback, which in turn will help us to reach out to all of the individuals 
in a heterogeneous population. 
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